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PREEMPTION

PRODUCT LIABILITY
The U.S. Supreme Court ruling in PLIVA Inc. v. Mensing will immunize generic drug
manufacturers facing failure-to-warn claims from state-law liability, and may also have implications for preemption jurisprudence more generally, says attorney Brian Wolfman and
co-author Dena Feldman in this BNA Insight. The authors analyze the ruling, and offer their
views on the questions that PLIVA raises about the ongoing vitality of the presumption
against preemption, the standard for determining ‘‘impossibility’’ preemption, and the propriety of deference to an agency’s views on preemption.
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n June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court ruled in
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing1 that FDA regulations governing the labeling of prescription drugs preempt
state-law failure-to-warn claims against generic drug
manufacturers. The Court’s ruling in PLIVA comes just
two years after its decision in Wyeth v. Levine,2 which
held that the FDA’s approval of a brand-name prescription drug label generally does not preempt a state-law
damages action premised on the manufacturer’s failure
to warn of a hazard associated with the drug.
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2
This article describes the Court’s decision and assesses its impact. Because it is difficult to understand
PLIVA without appreciating its facts and the basics of
generic drug regulation, those topics are addressed in
Part I below. Part II describes the Supreme Court’s decision, and Part III discusses its likely effects.

I. Background
A. The Facts
In March 2001, Gladys Mensing’s doctor prescribed
her the brand-name drug Reglan to treat diabetic gastroparesis, a paralysis that delays emptying of the stomach.3 In 2002, Julie Demahy’s doctor prescribed Reglan
to treat her gastroesophageal reflux disorder.4 Reglan
promotes contractions of the esophagus, stomach, and
intestines by blocking the body’s dopamine receptors.5
Under their states’ generic drug substitution laws,
Mensing’s and Demahy’s pharmacists filled their
Reglan prescriptions with generic metoclopramide,
Reglan’s active ingredient.6 All 50 states have adopted a
form of these laws, which allow or require pharmacists
to substitute a generic drug when presented with a prescription for a brand-name drug.7 Mensing and
Demahy took generic metoclopramide, as prescribed,
for four years, and both developed tardive dyskinesia.8
Tardive dyskinesia is a neurological disorder characterized by flagrant involuntary movements.9
Mensing and Demahy filed separate state-law damages suits alleging that ‘‘despite mounting evidence that
long term metoclopramide carries a risk of tardive dyskinesia far greater than indicated on the label,’’ the generic drug manufacturers had failed to modify their labels adequately to warn of the risk.10 The drug manufacturers argued in both cases that the plaintiffs’ statelaw tort claims were preempted by federal law.

B. Relevant FDA Regulation of Generic Drugs
1. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments and Initial Generic
Drug Approval. In 1984, seeking to expand the availability of less expensive prescription drugs, Congress
passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act, popularly known as the HatchWaxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Hatch-Waxman streamlined the
approval process for generic drugs. Ordinarily, a manufacturer of a new drug must go through an extensive
approval process dictated by the federal Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), often involving long and costly
clinical trials to assure that the drug is safe and effective for its intended use.11 Hatch-Waxman, on the other
hand, allows generic drugs to bypass the clinical trial
process required for new drugs. Under Hatch-Waxman,
3
Brief for Respondents at 4, in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, No.
09–993 (filed Feb. 23, 2011) (hereafter ‘‘Brief for Respondents’’), available at 2011 WL 686400, *4.
4
Id.
5
Id. at *6.
6
Id. at *4-*5.
7
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2583.
8
Brief for Respondents, 2011 WL 686400, *4-*5.
9
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2572-73.
10
See, e.g., Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 605 (8th
Cir. 2009).
11
See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)-(d).

9-5-11

once the patent for a brand-name drug expires, manufacturers may apply to market a generic version of the
drug and piggyback off the brand-name drug’s demonstrations of safety and effectiveness.12
Instead of the lengthy approval process required for
new drugs, under Hatch-Waxman, generic drug manufacturers seek approval under the abbreviated new
drug application (ANDA) process.13 In an ANDA,
manufacturers must show that the generic drug is ‘‘bioequivalent’’ to the brand-name drug — that is, the same
in terms of active ingredients, safety, and efficacy.14 As
part of the ANDA process, the FDA approves the generic drug’s label, which must be ‘‘the same as the labeling approved for the [brand-name] drug[.]’’15 According to the Solicitor General’s amicus brief in
PLIVA, the FDA places ‘‘a very high priority [on] assuring consistency in labeling’’ between the brand-name
drug and its generic equivalent ‘‘to minimize any cause
for confusion among health care professionals and consumers as well as to preclude a basis for lack of confidence in the equivalency of generic versus brand name
products.’’16
Taken together, Hatch-Waxman and state generic
drug substitution laws ‘‘have proved wildly successful’’
in bringing generic drugs to the market.17 Since HatchWaxman’s enactment, the market share for generic prescription drugs has gone from roughly 19 percent to 75
percent,18 and, when a drug has a generic equivalent,
about 90 percent of that drug’s prescriptions are filled
with the generic.19 In an amicus brief in PLIVA, a group
of experts in the fields of pharmaceutical regulation and
health care conducted a market analysis showing that
‘‘out of 4,653 approved drugs with distinct ingredients,
delivery routes, and strengths, more than half — 2,438
— are available in generic form. Of those, 1,062 are
available solely in generic form[.]’’20

2. Post-Approval Requirements. After granting approval for the manufacture and sale of a generic drug,
the FDA continues to regulate the drug’s label. Recognizing that with the passage of time, more information
on adverse side effects and risks associated with a drug
will eventually come to light, the FDA requires that
drug manufacturers keep track of adverse clinical experiences and submit annual reports to the FDA documenting ‘‘significant new information from the previous year that might affect the safety, effectiveness, or
labeling of the drug product’ ’’ and a ‘‘description of actions the applicant has taken or intends to take as a re12

See generally id. § 355(j).
Id.
14
See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv).
15
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v).
16
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 4, in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, No. 09-993 (filed
Mar. 2, 2011) (hereafter ‘‘SG Brief’’) (citing Division of Generic
Drugs, Food & Drug Administration, Policy and Procedure
Guide 37 (1989)), available at 2011 WL 741927, *4.
17
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Brief for Mark T. Law, et al., at 18 (emphasis in original),
in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, No. 09-993 (filed Mar. 2, 2011)
(hereafter ‘‘Experts Brief’’), available at 2011 WL 794111, *18;
see also PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(citing same and similar data showing that ‘‘from one-third to
one-half of generic drugs no longer have a marketed brandname equivalent’’).
13
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sult of this new information.’’21 The FDA requires that
manufacturers revise their warning labels ‘‘as soon as
there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a drug.’’22 These requirements apply
equally to manufacturers of generic and brand-name
drugs.23
Ordinarily, when a manufacturer seeks to change its
label it files a supplemental application under the Prior
Approval Supplement procedure, which requires the
FDA’s approval prior to revision of the label.24 However, a manufacturer seeking to ‘‘add or strengthen a
contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction’’ may use the Changes Being Effected, or CBE, process.25 Although the FDA must ultimately approve the
change, the manufacturer need not wait for approval
before revising the label under the CBE process.26 FDA
regulations also allow drug manufacturers to notify
health providers of risks greater than those that appear
on the product’s label through notices called ‘‘Dear
Health Care Professional’’ (DHCP) letters.27
As we shall see, the FDA believes that only brandname manufacturers, and not generic drug manufacturers, may use the CBE process or unilaterally employ a
DHCP letter to warn of new risks, and the Court in
PLIVA agreed.

C. History of Reglan/Metoclopramide
The following regulatory history of Reglan is taken
largely from the plaintiffs’ brief in PLIVA. The FDA first
approved Reglan in 1980 to treat acute and recurrent
diabetic gastric stress.28 Reglan was initially approved
for treatment periods of 2 to 8 weeks. In 1984, the
agency added an indication for ‘‘short-term (4 to 12
weeks) therapy’’ to treat reflux.29 In 1985, the FDA first
approved the manufacture and sale of generic metoclopramide.30
As noted above, metoclopramide enhances contractions in the gastrointestinal system.31 It works by blocking dopamine receptors, which affect the transfer of signals between nerves,32 including in the extrapyramidal
system, the part of the brain that controls fine motor
skills.33 Tardive dyskinesia is a severe form of interference with the extrapyramidal system marked by ‘‘grotesque involuntary movements of the mouth, tongue,
lips, and extremities, involuntary chewing movements,
and a general sense of agitation.’’34
Metoclopramide’s label first warned of the risks of
tardive dyskinesia in 1985. The ‘‘Warnings’’ section of
the label identified tardive dyskinesia as a possible side
21

21 C.F.R. 314.81(b)(2)(i).
Id. § 201.57(e) (2001).
See SG Brief, 2011 WL 741927, at *7 (citing 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.97).
24
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b).
25
Id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A).
26
21 CFR § 314.70(c)(7); see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at __-__,
129 S. Ct. at 1196-98.
27
SG Brief, 2011 WL 741927, at *7 (citing 21 C.F.R.
§ 200.5).
28
Brief for Respondents, 2011 WL 686400, *6.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. (quoting McNeil v. Wyeth, 462 F.3d 364, 366 (5th Cir.
2006)).
22
23
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effect that would appear ‘‘far less frequently than the
far more readily treatable’’ problems with the extrapyramidal system controlling fine motor movements.35
Specifically, the label indicated that tardive dyskinesia
would occur in far fewer patients than the 1 in 500 patients who experience some type of problem with the
extrapyramidal system as a result of using metoclopramide.36
However, ‘‘prior to mid-2003, at least 87 cases of tardive dyskinesia associated with metoclopramide had
been reported to FDA’s Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS), most involving long-term use of the product.’’37 No metoclopramide manufacturer proposed to
the FDA a label change to reflect this greater risk.38
The warning on the metoclomparmide label remained the same until 2009, after the injuries suffered
by Mensing and Demahy.39 In 2009, the FDA, acting on
its own, ordered metoclopramide manufacturers to include a ‘‘boxed warning,’’ the strongest warning possible, about the increased risk of tardive dyskinesia associated with long-term use of the drug.40 The boxed
warning stated:
Chronic treatment with metoclopramide can cause tardive
dyskinesia, a serious movement disorder that is often irreversible . . . . Prolonged treatment (greater than 12 weeks)
with metoclopramide should be avoided in all but rare cases
where therapeutic benefit is thought to outweigh the risks
to the patient of developing tardive dyskinesia.41

The boxed warning noted that a published study had
found that tardive dyskinesia occurred in 20 percent of
patients treated with metoclopramide for at least three
months, ‘‘a hundred times greater than the 0.2 percent
risk previously identified on the label.’’42

D. Lower Court Proceedings
In 2007, Mensing and Demahy sued PLIVA, Inc. and
Actavis, Inc., respectively, manufacturers of the generic
version of metoclopramide that they had taken. They alleged that the labels accompanying metoclopramide
failed adequately to warn about the risks of tardive dyskinesia associated with long-term use of the drug. In
Mensing’s case, the federal district court in Minnesota
granted the drug manufacturer’s motion to dismiss,
holding that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the
FDCA preempt state-law failure-to-warn claims.43 The
Eighth Circuit reversed, citing the Supreme Court’s
then-recent decision in Wyeth v. Levine, which, as
noted, held that state-law failure-to-warn claims against
brand-name drug manufacturers generally are not preempted by the FDCA.44 In Demahy’s case, a federal district court in Louisiana denied a similar motion to dismiss filed by the generic manufacturer.45 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Demahy’s state-law claims
35

Id. at *6.
Id. at *8 n.10.
37
Id. at *9.
38
Id. at *10.
39
Id. at *9.
40
Id.
41
Id. at *10-*11; see also PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2573 (quoting
boxed warning).
42
Brief for Respondents, 2011 WL 686400, *11.
43
See Mensing v. Wyeth, 588 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 2009).
44
See id. at 607-08 (discussing Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555).
45
Demahy v. Wyeth, 586 F. Supp. 2d 642 (E.D. La. 2008).
36
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were not preempted, also based largely on Wyeth.46
The Supreme Court granted both generic manufacturers’ petitions for certiorari and consolidated the cases
for review.

II. The Supreme Court’s Decision
As noted above, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in favor
of the generic drug companies, holding that the FDCA
and regulations governing generic drugs preempted
Mensing’s and Demehy’s state-law failure-to-warn
claims. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion,
joined in full by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Alito. Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion in all but one part. Justice Sotomayor dissented,
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan.

A. Justice Thomas’s Majority Opinion
1. Framing the Issues. Justice Thomas began the majority opinion by noting the parties’ agreement that, under state law in both Louisiana and Minnesota, the
plaintiffs’ allegations, if true, would have required the
generic drug manufacturers to use a metaclopromide
label with warnings about the risk of tardive dyskinesia
that were different from warnings on the FDA-approved
label.47 Thus, the issue presented was whether the duties imposed on generic drug manufacturers by federal
regulations conflicted with, and therefore preempted,
the state-law duties that would have required a different
drug label.
The majority decision that the federal requirements
for generic drug labeling preempt state-law failure-towarn claims was built on two pillars. First, the Court deferred to the FDA’s interpretations of regulations regarding prescription drug labeling. Second, the Court
announced a standard for determining when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, thus
triggering implied conflict preemption. We deal with
each aspect of the decision in turn.
2. Deference to the FDA. The plaintiffs, on the one
hand, and the generic drug manufacturers and the FDA,
on the other, presented different views of the actions
that generic manufacturers may take under federal
drug labeling regulations. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court deferred to the FDA. Mensing and
Demahy maintained that the generic drug companies
could have, and should have, used the ‘‘changes being
effected,’’ or CBE, process unilaterally to modify their
labels to warn of the true risks of metoclopramide.48
They argued that the CBE process is one way that generic drug manufacturers ‘‘bring evidence of the need
for a new warning to FDA’s attention and initiate consideration of whether the labels for both the [brandname] and generic drugs should be changed.’’49 If the
FDA ultimately approves the changes made by a generic manufacturer under the CBE process, the agency
will then require that the same change take place on the
brand-name label. Thus, the plaintiffs argued, a temporary departure in identical labeling between the generic
and brand manufacturer ‘‘reflects FDA’s determination
46

Demahy v. Actavis, 593 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010).
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2574.
48
Brief for Respondents, 2011 WL 686400, *34.
49
Id.
47
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that such temporary differences are justified in the interest of drug safety.’’50 They maintained that the generic drug companies also could have sent a DHCP letter to health professionals warning of the adverse risks
associated with metoclopramide.51 They argued, as
they had argued with respect to the CBE process, that
all drug companies may send a DHCP letter without
prior FDA approval.52
But the Solicitor General’s amicus brief explained
that, in the FDA’s view, federal regulations do not afford generic manufacturers the option unilaterally to alter their labels because of the overriding statutory and
regulatory requirement that generic drugs labels mirror
the labels of their brand-name counterparts. Thus, the
FDA maintained, the federal labeling scheme precluded
generic manufactures from unilaterally changing their
labels, even under the CBE process.53 The unilateral
use of a DHCP, the Solicitor General maintained, is
likewise unavailable to generic drug manufacturers (at
least under the circumstances presented in PLIVA).54
Although the FDA conceded that no regulation precludes generic drug manufacturers from sending these
letters, it argued that such a letter ‘‘would only be appropriate in tandem with a corresponding change to the
[brand-name] drug’s approved labeling.’’55 And, because a generic manufacturer could not take advantage
of the CBE process, the appearance of new risk information in a DHCP letter would be ‘‘contrary to [FDA]
approved’’ labeling.56
The Supreme Court deferred to the FDA’s reading of
the regulations regarding the CBE and DHCP processes, holding that the agency’s views are ‘‘controlling
unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation[s].’’57 Unusually, the majority opinion did
not even address the interpretations of the regulations
offered by the parties. Rather, in a consummate application of administrative deference, it just noted that in
the absence of any reason to doubt the agency’s views,
those views would control.58 Thus, the Court accepted
the FDA’s argument that generic manufacturers cannot
unilaterally change their labels under the CBE process
or unilaterally issue DHCP letters.
Despite its position that generic manufacturers could
not act unilaterally via the CBE process or through a
DHCP letter, the FDA told the Supreme Court that the
FDCA does not preempt state-law failure-to-warn
claims against generic manufacturers.59 The FDA
claimed that generic drug manufacturers had various
opportunities to inform the agency about adverse reactions and risks caused by their products and seek permission to revise their labels.60 In this regard, the FDA
pointed to the preamble to the final rule implementing
the ANDA process:
If an ANDA applicant believes new safety information should be added to a product’s labeling, it should
50

Id. at *35.
Id. at *36.
52
Id. at*37.
53
SG Brief, 2011 WL 741927, *19.
54
Id. at *18 (citing 21 CFR § 200.5).
55
Id. at *18.
56
Id. at *19 (citing 21 CFR § 21.201.100(d)(1)).
57
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 457, 461 (1997)).
58
Id.; accord id. at 2585 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
59
SG Brief, 2011 WL 741927, *22-*35.
60
Id. at *14, *20.
51
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contact FDA, and FDA will determine whether the labeling for the generic and listed drugs should be revised. After approval of an ANDA, if an ANDA holder
believes that new safety information should be added, it
should provide adequate supporting information to
FDA, and FDA will determine whether the labeling for
the generic and listed drugs should be revised.61
The FDA noted as well that its Office of Generic
Drugs is available to ANDA holders to resolve concerns
with their products and will give high priority to ‘‘ANDAs with possible serious safety concerns.’’62 After notification from an ANDA holder of possible adverse
health risks caused by an approved drug, the Solicitor
General told the Court, the FDA can evaluate the risk,
and, if necessary, request that the brand-name manufacturer change its label or withdraw the drug’s approval.63 Because generic drug manufacturers are not
powerless to set in place a process that could lead to
safety-enhancing label changes or product removal,
both of which could be consistent with state-law duties,
FDA maintained, state-law failure-to-warn claims are
not preempted.
Although the Supreme Court deferred to FDA’s interpretation of its CBE and DHCP regulations, the Court
relegated to a footnote another, arguably inconsistent
holding: that it would not defer at all to the agency’s
‘‘ultimate conclusion about whether state law should be
preempted.’’64 And, as explained in the next section of
this Article, with the Court now free to consider the preemption question de novo, the Court rejected the FDA’s
no-preemption position.

3. Impossibility Preemption. The Supreme Court based
its holding that the plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims
were preempted on a finding that ‘‘it was impossible for
the [generic] Manufacturers to comply with both their
state-law duty to change the label and their federal law
duty to keep the label the same.’’65 As indicated earlier,
the plaintiffs and the FDA argued that, to claim preemption by impossibility, the generic manufacturers were
required to show that they went to the FDA with a label
change that could have prevented the plaintiffs’ injuries
and that the FDA would have denied any requested label change. Thus, according to the plaintiffs and the
FDA, only after the manufacturers had asked the FDA
for a stronger warning after learning about the link between their product and tardive diskinesia, and the FDA
had rejected a label change to provide that warning,
could the manufacturers claim that compliance with a
state-law failure-to-warn duty is truly impossible. In
PLIVA, the generic metoclopramide manufacturers had
failed even to ask the FDA to strengthen the label, a
course of action that the manufacturers conceded was
open to them. Thus, the plaintiffs argued, their claims
were not preempted.66
61
Id. at *20 (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,961 (Apr. 28,
1992)).
62
Id. at *21 (quoting Center for Drug Evaluation & Research, Manual of Policies & Procedures 5200.6 (May 9,
2001)).
63
Id. at *21-*22 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(e); 21 C.F.R.
§§ 314.70, 314.150(a)(2)).
64
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575 n.3 (citing Wyeth, 555 U.S. at
576). We discuss the significance of this no-deference holding
in Part III.B.3 below.
65
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2578.
66
Id.
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The Supreme Court majority disagreed, reasoning
that had the manufacturers undertaken the courses of
action advocated by the plaintiffs and the FDA, and
asked for a label change, they still would not have satisfied the state-law duty on which the plaintiffs relied:
‘‘State law demanded a safer label; it did not instruct
the Manufacturers to communicate with the FDA about
the possibility of a safer label.’’67 If the generic manufacturers had alerted the FDA to the increased risk,
rather than satisfying their state-law tort law duties, the
Court wrote, they would have done no more than
‘‘started a Mouse Trap game that eventually [could
have led] to a better label on generic metoclopramide.’’68
But, in the Court’s view, the Mouse Trap game was
not enough to avoid preemption. Instead, the Court devised a new test for escaping preemption by impossibility: ‘‘whether the private party could independently do
under federal law what state law requires of it.’’69 By
contrast, the Court characterized the plaintiffs’ and the
FDA’s position as relying on ‘‘conjectures’’ about what
might have transpired had the manufacturers sought a
label change.70 Allowing hypothetical scenarios — such
as the defendant’s non-existent request for a label
change and the FDA’s non-existent response — to drive
preemption analysis, Justice Thomas proclaimed,
‘‘would render conflict pre-emption largely meaningless because it would make most conflicts between state
and federal law illusory.’’71
The Court emphasized that the generic manufacturers could not satisfy the state-law duty for a safer label
until they secured FDA approval for that label. The requirement of federal government cooperation in satisfying state-law tort duties, particularly when dependent
on the exercise of judgment by a federal agency, necessarily meant that the regulated party — here, the generic manufacturer — could not ‘‘independently’’ comply with both state and federal law.72 Put another way,
because ‘‘ask[ing] the FDA for help’’ in changing the label, and not changing the label on their own, was the
only action the manufacturers could ‘‘independently’’
take, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ failure-towarn claims were preempted.73

B. Justice Thomas’s Plurality Opinion
Part III.B.2 of Justice Thomas’s opinion was a plurality opinion joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Alito,
but not by Justice Kennedy, who joined fully in the rest
of the opinion and provided one of the five votes for the
judgment in the generic manufacturers’ favor. The plurality set out a novel, originalist view of preemption
based on a law review article by University of Virginia
law professor Caleb Nelson. Justice Thomas focused on
the text of the Supremacy Clause, particularly the
phrase ‘‘any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding,’’74 This phrase,
Justice Thomas explained, is a ‘‘non obstante provi67

Id.
Id.
69
Id. at 2579 (emphasis added) (citing Wyeth, 555 U.S. at
573).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
68
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sion,’’ that is, a phrase in a new statute that ‘‘repeal[s]
older, potentially conflicting statutes in the same
field.’’75 These provisions were often used in the 1770s
and 1780s, Justice Thomas maintained, as an instruction to courts ‘‘not to apply the general presumption
against implied repeals.’’76 Thus, according to Justice
Thomas, the presence of such a phrase in the Supremacy Clause suggested that the Constitution’s drafters intended that ‘‘federal law should be understood to
impliedly repeal conflicting state law.’’77 For this reason, when engaged in conflict-preemption analysis,
‘‘courts should not strain to find ways to reconcile federal law with seemingly conflicting state law.’’78
Justice Thomas sought support for this new theory in
his concurring opinion in Wyeth v. Levine, explaining
that under the Supremacy Clause’s non obstante language, courts should not ‘‘distort federal law to accommodate conflicting state law,’’ and instead should look
to a statute’s ‘‘ordinary meaning.’’79 For Justice Thomas, the ordinary meaning of the federal regulations
governing generic drug labels and state tort law evidenced conflicting duties. And, allowing ‘‘contingencies,’’ such as FDA approval of a hypothetical request
for a label change, to determine the meaning of federal
law would go beyond its ‘‘ordinary meaning,’’80 and
runs headlong into the Supremacy Clause’s textual demand that conflicting state law is impliedly repealed.81

C. Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent
Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. The dissent accused the majority of rewriting the Court’s recent decision in Wyeth,
ignoring longstanding precedents regarding ‘‘impossibility’’ preemption, and undermining the presumption
against preemption.

1. Impossibility. Justice Sotomayor characterized the
majority’s impossibility analysis as having ‘‘no basis in
[the Court’s] precedents.’’82 A company’s ability to ‘‘independently’’ change its label cannot be the test for impossibility; after all, she wrote, even when brand-name
manufacturers change their labels through the CBE
process, these changes are not truly independent, but
rather, ultimately subject to FDA approval.83 In Wyeth,
the Court held that, to establish preemption, the brandname drug manufacturer was required to produce
‘‘ ‘clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved
a change to [the] label.’ ’’84 So, Justice Sotomayor explained, the same test should apply to a generic manufacturer, whose claim of impossibility preemption also
ought to depend on FDA rejection of a requested label
change.85 Only then, the dissent argued, would manu-

facturers be able to show that compliance with both
federal and state law was genuinely impossible.86
In response to the majority’s position that any narrower impossibility doctrine would render conflict preemption meaningless, the dissent noted that conflict
preemption also exists ‘‘where the state law ‘stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ’’87 Thus, the
majority’s broad definition of impossibility was, Justice
Sotomayor maintained, ‘‘unnecessary to prevent conflict pre-emption from losing all meaning.’’88

2. Response to Justice Thomas’s Plurality Opinion and
Concerns About the Presumption Against Preemption. Justice Sotomayor disputed Justice Thomas’s view that the
non obstante language of the Supremacy Clause directs
courts to find that federal law impliedly repeals conflicting state law. She argued that the plurality had
‘‘invent[ed] new principles of preemption law out of
thin air’’ in ‘‘a direct assault’’ on more than half a century of Supreme Court precedents in which the Court
has cautioned against presuming that federal law supersedes state law.89 She explained:
‘‘Whereas we have long presumed that federal law
does not pre-empt, or repeal, state law, the plurality today reads the Supremacy Clause to operate as a provision instructing courts ‘not to apply the general presumption against implied repeals.’ And whereas we
have long required evidence of a ‘‘clear and manifest’’
purpose to preempt, the plurality now instructs courts
to ‘look no further than the ordinary meaning of federal
law’ before concluding that Congress must have intended to cast aside state law.’’90
According to Justice Sotomayor, if the Court had applied the presumption against preemption in PLIVA,
and thus accepted the plausible reading of federal law
offered by the plaintiffs and the FDA, it would have
come to a different result and required the generic
manufacturers to ‘‘attempt to comply with state law before being heard that compliance is impossible.’’91
In addition to noting the departure from precedent
establishing that courts should hesitate to find state law
preempted, the dissent referred repeatedly to the decision’s ‘‘absurd’’ consequences.92 Under the majority’s
reasoning, she explained, whether an injured consumer
may bring a failure-to-warn claim against a drug manufacturer will depend on ‘‘the happenstance’’ of whether
the consumer’s pharmacist dispensed the brand-name
or generic version of the drug.93
The dissent argued that this result is at odds with
Hatch-Waxman’s purpose of increasing the availability
and use of lower priced, generic prescription drugs.94
The elimination of tort liability for generic drugs could,
86

75

Id.
76
Id. (quoting Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev.
225, 241-42 (2000)).
77
Id. at 2580.
78
Id.
79
Id. (citing Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 588 (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment)).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 2589 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
83
Id.
84
Id. at 2588 (quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 571).
85
Id.
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Id. at 2588-89.
Id. at 2590 (quoting Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 360, 373 (2000)).
88
Id.
89
Id. at 2591.
90
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original); see
also, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449
(2005) (when faced with two plausible interpretations of a statute, the Court has ‘‘a duty to accept the reading that disfavors
preemption.’’).
91
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2592.
92
Id. at 2593.
93
Id. at 2592.
94
Id. at 2593.
87
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Justice Sotomayor posited, reduce consumer demand
for generic drugs and pose an ‘‘ethical dilemma’’ for
prescribing physicians,95 who, on the one hand, want to
reduce costs for their patients by prescribing generic
drugs, but, on the other hand, do not want to immunize
the manufacturer from liability every time they do so.96
The dissent found this result striking in the absence
of any evidence that Congress considered immunizing
generic manufacturers from tort liability,97which, in the
past, the Court has required before ‘‘depriv[ing] injured
parties of a long available form of compensation.’’98

III. PLIVA’s Future Effect
PLIVA will immunize generic drug manufacturers
facing failure-to-warn claims from state-law liability. It
may also have implications for preemption jurisprudence more generally. We address these issues in turn.

A. Failure-to-Warn Claims Against Generic Drug
Manufacturers
The obvious effect of PLIVA is to eliminate failure-towarn claims against the manufacturers of generic
drugs. Consumers harmed by a mislabeled generic drug
will be unable to hold the manufacturers liable under
state law. This holding is significant because, as explained earlier, about 75 percent of all drug prescriptions are for generic drugs,99 and every state has a substitution law that permits or requires pharmacists who
receive a prescription for a brand-name drug to fill it
with that drug’s generic equivalent.100 As occurred with
the plaintiffs in PLIVA, generic substitution typically occurs without the consumer’s consent or knowledge.
Even in states where pharmacists are only permitted
(not required) to substitute generic for brand-name
drugs, because insurance companies often charge
higher co-pays for a brand-name drug when a generic
is available,101 consumers tend to opt for generics. As
noted earlier, about 90 percent of prescriptions for
drugs available in both brand-name and generic forms
are filled with generics.102 Thus, the Court’s holding
95
Id. (citing Brief for American Medical Association et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 29).
96
Justice Sotomayor’s concern that doctors might prescribe brand-name drugs to protect their patients’ state-law
rights is not rendered irrelevant by state generic substitution
laws. A doctor generally can override even the purportedly
mandatory versions of those laws by prescribing the brandname product and writing ‘‘dispense as written,’’ or ‘‘DAW,’’
on her prescription pad. See Ranit Mishori, ‘‘Some doctors insist on brand-name drugs even when cheaper generics are
available,’’ The Washington Post, July 11, 2011, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/some-doctors-insiston-brand-name-drugs-even-when-cheaper-generics-areavailable/2011/06/13/gIQAmC0L9H_story.html.
97
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2593.
98
Bates, 554 U.S. at 449.
99
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2884 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
100
But see supra note 96.
101
Experts Brief, 2011 WL 794111, *20 (citing Geoffrey F.
Joyce et al., ‘‘Employer Drug Benefit Plans and Spending on
Prescription Drugs,’’ 288 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 1733, 1733-34
(2002); Haiden A. Huskamp et al., ‘‘The Effect of Incentivebased Formularies on Prescription-Drug Utilization and
Spending,’’ 349 New Eng. J. Med. 2224, 2225 (2003)); see also
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2584 n.2 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
102
Id. at 2584.
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eliminating state-law remedies for failure-to-warn
claims will have significant consequences.
It remains to be seen whether the incongruous liability rules established by Wyeth and PLIVA will hold. The
majority and dissent in PLIVA agreed on one thing:
Leaving the states free to impose liability for failure to
warn on a brand-name label while immunizing the
makers of generic drugs ‘‘makes little sense[.]’’103 Indeed, the PLIVA majority ‘‘acknowledge[d] the unfortunate hand that federal drug regulation has dealt
Mensing, Demahy, and others similarly situated.’’104
Thus, the Court’s unanimity on the ruling’s unfortunate
policy implications may prompt an effort to rationalize
the drug-labeling and/or liability rules governing brandname and generic drugs.
Until the ruling in PLIVA, state-law damages remedies had been ‘‘long available’’ against both brandname and generic manufacturers,105 and in light of the
Court’s ruling in Wyeth v. Levine that failure-to-warn
claims against brand-name manufacturers generally
are not preempted, it is exceedingly unlikely that Congress will harmonize the liability regime by immunizing
the manufacturers of brand-name drugs. Rather, harmonization will occur, if at all, by overruling the result
in PLIVA, either by regulation or legislation.

1. Potential Regulatory Action. Because the ruling in
PLIVA turned on the asserted impossibility of a manufacturer’s simultaneous compliance with both federal
labeling rules for generic drugs and a state-law duty to
make safety-based revisions to a generic drug label, the
FDA could amend its labeling rules to eliminate the impossibility identified by the Supreme Court majority.
Recall that, in Wyeth, the Court had rejected preemption by impossibility because, among other reasons, the
FDA’s CBE regulation authorized brand-name drug
manufacturers unilaterally to amend their labels to add
warnings, rendering a state-law claim premised on a
duty to have issued such warnings consistent with, not
in conflict with, federal law.106
PLIVA came to the opposite conclusion because, the
Court held, FDA regulations did not authorize unilateral changes to generic drug labels.107 Presumably,
then, if the FDA were to amend its rules to authorize generic drug manufacturers to use the CBE regulation in
some or all of the circumstances under which brandname manufacturers currently have that authority, the
federal regulatory basis for PLIVA’s impossibility holding would no longer exist. This amendment would
eliminate the absurd consequences of having inconsistent state-law tort duties for brand-name and generic
drug manufacturers highlighted in Justice Sotomayor’s
PLIVA dissent.
It bears emphasis, however, that whatever the benefits of state-law tort liability in enhancing patient
safety and providing compensation for injuries, and the
Court in Wyeth thought them considerable,108 the
FDA’s principal consideration here should be to rationalize and modernize its generic drug labeling rules.
103

Id. at 2581 (majority opinion).
Id.
105
Id. at 2592 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Wyeth,
555 U.S. at ___-___, 129 S. Ct. at 1199-1200.
106
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at ___-___, 129 S. Ct. at 1196-97; accord
id. at 1209-10 (Thomas, J., concurring in the result).
107
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575-76.
108
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1202.
104
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The FDA promulgated its CBE regulation because it
wanted to provide a mechanism for companies to
amend their labels when new safety information
‘‘require[d] prompt corrective action,’’109 without forcing the products off the market until the agency approved (or rejected) the amended label. The idea, then,
was to protect patients both by putting the most up-todate information into their (and their doctors’) hands
and by assuring their continued access to needed medications.
There is no reason why this same mechanism should
not be available to generic manufacturers. In 1982,
when the CBE regulation was first proposed,110 the generic drug revolution spurred by Hatch-Waxman,
whose enactment was two years into the future, might
not have been anticipated. Today, however, as explained earlier, when a particular drug is available in
generic form, generic products dominate the market,
with an average 90 percent market share, and, often,
the presence of low-cost generics push the brand-name
drugs off the market entirely.111
Moreover, as discussed briefly in Part I.B.2 above,
both brand-name and generic drug manufacturers must
comply with regulations designed to ensure the postapproval safety of their drugs and must ‘‘promptly review all adverse drug experience information obtained
or otherwise received by the applicant from any source,
foreign or domestic, including information derived from
commercial marketing experience, postmarketing clinical investigations, postmarketing epidemiological/
surveillance studies, reports in the scientific literature,
and unpublished scientific papers.’’112 Any report of a
‘‘serious and unexpected’’ drug experience must be reported to the FDA within 15 days and must be promptly
investigated by the manufacturer.113 Most other adverse event reports must be submitted quarterly for
three years after the application is approved and annually after that.114 These periodic reports must include
‘‘a history of actions taken since the last report because
of adverse drug experiences (for example, labeling
changes or studies initiated).’’115 The upshot of these
regulatory requirements is that generic manufacturers,
like their brand-name counterparts, participate actively
in post-market surveillance of their products and are in
a good position to know about adverse events and the
need, if any, for labeling changes that would enhance
patient safety.
Given the market presence of generic products and
the role of generic manufacturers in post-market surveillance, it is sensible for both brand-name and generic
manufacturers to be authorized to use the CBE process.
After a brand-name manufacturer employs the CBE
process, the FDA determines whether the proposed label change is appropriate and should therefore be
adopted across the board by all sellers of the drug. The
FDA can make the same determinations when a generic
manufacturer employs the CBE process.
109

47 Fed. Reg. 46,622, 46,635 (Oct. 19, 1982).
See id. at 46,650; see also 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7498 (Feb.
22, 1985) (final rule).
111
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
112
21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b) (made applicable to ANDA holders
by 21 C.F.R. § 98(a)).
113
Id. § 314.80(c)(1)(i-ii).
114
Id. § 314.80(c)(2)(i).
115
Id. § 314.80(c)(2)(ii).
110
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2. Potential Congressional Action. Congress could
overrule PLIVA in one of two ways (or, presumably, in
both ways). First, it could amend the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act to provide that neither the Act nor its
regulations preempt state-law failure-to-warn claims.
Second, just as the FDA might do, Congress could provide directly that generic drug manufacturers, like
brand-name manufacturers, are authorized to use the
CBE process. The first route may be more appropriate,
as Congress can and frequently has expressly patrolled
the dividing line between state and federal law,116 and
the FDA is not charged by Congress with determining
the best means to compensate patients injured by the
products it regulates. On the other hand, it is probably
best to leave the nuances of drug labeling policy to the
FDA, the agency charged by Congress with creating
and enforcing that policy. In any event, whether Congress will have the votes in the near term to overrule
PLIVA is questionable.117

B. Effects on Preemption Jurisprudence
PLIVA raises questions about the Court’s preemption
jurisprudence regarding the ongoing vitality of the presumption against preemption, the standard for determining ‘‘impossibility’’ preemption, and the propriety of
deference to an agency’s views on preemption. We address each issue below.

1. Is the presumption against preemption on life
support? For decades, in both express and implied preemption cases,118 the Court has applied a presumption
against preemption — that is, ‘‘a duty to accept the
reading that disfavors preemption’’ when a federal statute plausibly admits of both a preemptive and nonpreemptive reading.119 The Court has grounded this
principle in federalism, in the idea that unless Congress
ousts state law with unmistakable clarity, the states
should be free to chart their own course, particularly in
areas traditionally regulated by the states:
[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in
our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state law causes of
action. In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in
those in which Congress has ‘‘legislated . . . in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied,’’ we ‘‘start
with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’’120
116
See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136v (preemption and antipreemption provisions for federally regulated pesticides); 21
U.S.C. § 360k (preemption provision for medical devices, with
exemption from preemption in some circumstances); 21 U.S.C.
§ 379r (preemption provision for over-the-counter drugs, with
savings clause for product liability actions).
117
In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008), the Supreme Court held that 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) preempts most
state-law damages claims for injuries caused by medical devices that go through full FDA premarket approval. Shortly
thereafter, legislation was introduced to overrule Riegel, see
H.R. 1346 (2009); S. 540 (2009), but it has not been enacted.
118
See 131 S. Ct. at 2591 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing
both express and implied preemption cases that invoke the
presumption against preemption); see also, e.g., Lohr, 518 U.S.
at 485.
119
Bates, 544 U.S. at 449.
120
Lohr, 518 at 485 (citations omitted).
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The Court has applied the presumption against preemption with special force where a pro-preemption outcome would ascribe to Congress an intent to eliminate
all remedies for consumers injured by unlawful conduct.121
It is difficult to square PLIVA with this longstanding
reluctance to preempt state law. The PLIVA majority
did not even mention the presumption against preemption. This silence is noteworthy because PLIVA involved
the availability of tort remedies for consumers injured
by faulty or mislabeled products, an area that the Court
consistently has considered ‘‘a field which the States
have traditionally occupied’’ and, thus, especially subject to the presumption against preemption.122
Moreover, as noted earlier, Justice Thomas’s fourJustice plurality opinion suggests that there is a battle
raging on the Court over the presumption’s propriety.
Adoption of Justice Thomas’s interpretive theory of the
Supremacy Clause, based on its non obstante language,
arguably would nullify the presumption against preemption. Rather than demanding ‘‘clear and manifest’’
congressional intent to preempt state law, as the Court
has traditionally done, Justice Thomas’s theory views
federal law, by force of the Supremacy Clause itself, as
‘‘impliedly repeal[ing] conflicting state law,’’ thus requiring a judge to look only to the text of relevant federal law and engage in ordinary statutory analysis. It is
difficult to see how these two approaches peaceably
could coexist.
In Wyeth, the dissenters —Justice Alito, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia — maintained
that the presumption against preemption does not apply
in implied conflict preemption cases.123 On the other
hand, most of the Justices have joined opinions endorsing the presumption against preemption, and, indeed,
Justice Thomas himself penned a partial dissent in an
express preemption case that relied forcefully on the
presumption against preemption, arguing that the
Court erroneously had held a state common-law claim
preempted and noting that the majority had not accorded sufficient ‘‘[r]espect for the presumptive sanctity of state law[.]’’124 Most important, in PLIVA, Justice
Kennedy did not join Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion, suggesting that he, like the four dissenters,125 was
concerned that Justice Thomas’s views of the Supremacy Clause would, if adopted by a Court majority,
effectively kill off the presumption against preemption
of state law. Time will tell whether, and, if so, in what
types of preemption cases, the presumption against preemption still lives.

2. A New Standard for ‘Impossibility’ Preemption?
PLIVA arguably established a new principle of ‘‘impossibility’’ preemption. Stated most generally, this subspecies of conflict preemption holds that state law is
preempted when it is impossible for a person subject to
121

See, e.g., Bates, 544 U.S. at 449-50; Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 69 (2002); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984); see generally Wyeth, 555 U.S.
at __-__ & n.3, __, 129 S. Ct. at 1194-95 & n.3, 1200.
122
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (citation omitted); see also, e.g.,
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at __-__, 129 S. Ct. at 1194-95.
123
Wyeth, 555 U.S. __-__ & n.14, 129 S. Ct. at 1228-29 &
n.14 (Alito, J., dissenting).
124
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 679
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2591-92 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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the demands of both state and federal law simultaneously to comply with both.126 In PLIVA, the plaintiffs
argued that compliance with both federal and state law
was not impossible — or, at least, that the generic
manufacturers had not met their burden of showing
that dual compliance was impossible — because if the
FDA had been asked by the manufacturers to approve
an amended metoclopramide label, it might not have rejected that request. And if the manufacturers could not
show that the FDA would have rejected an amended label, the argument goes, federal law would not conflict
with state-law principles demanding an amended
(safer) label.
As explained earlier, Justice Thomas rejected this argument, holding that because the manufacturers could
not independently change their labels under federal law
without violating the asserted state-law duty (to change
the labels), state law conflicted with, and was thus preempted by, federal law.127 In Justice Thomas’s view, to
allow a plaintiff to escape preemption based on the conjecture of what a third party might do would unduly
limit the scope of impossibility preemption to only those
circumstances where the third party took action that
made certain the conflict between state and federal law.
Why did Justice Thomas take this novel view of impossibility preemption? The answer is embedded, we
believe, in his views on conflict preemption more generally. It has been established doctrine for decades that
conflict preemption exists when compliance with both
state and federal law is impossible or when ‘‘the state
requirement [would] ‘stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ’’128 Standing alone on the Court,
Justice Thomas rejects any form of ‘‘obstacle’’ or ‘‘frustration of purposes’’ preemption, a position he espoused at length in his concurrence in Wyeth v. Levine.129 There, he maintained that this form of preemption is at odds with various constitutional imperatives of
federalism, including the Tenth Amendment, which underscore the States’ retention of ‘‘substantial sovereign
authority’’ and which seek ‘‘to protect [a] delicate balance of power’’ between state and federal authority.130
In Wyeth, Justice Thomas also rejected obstacle preemption on two other, related grounds. First, he argued,
that the Supremacy Clause, which makes ‘‘supreme’’
only those laws ‘‘made in Pursuance’’ of the Constitution,’’131 and the Bicameralism and Presentment
Clauses, which demand that the ‘‘passage of legislation’ ’’ follow ‘‘ ‘a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process,’ ’’ require ‘‘that preemptive effect be given
only to those federal standards and policies that are set
forth in, or necessarily follow from, the statutory text
that was produced through the constitutionally required
126
See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
127
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2579.
128
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 507 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
129
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at __-__, __-__, 129 S. Ct. at 1205-07,
1211-17 (Thomas, J, concurring in the judgment).
130
Id. at 1205-06. Note, here, the tension between Justice
Thomas’s deference to the states’ constitutional prerogatives
in Wyeth and his apparent rejection of the presumption
against preemption less than three years later in PLIVA.
131
Id. at 1206 (quoting U.S. Const. Art IV, cl. 2).
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bicameral and presentment procedures.’’132 Second, he
explained that obstacle preemption ‘‘encourages an
overly expansive reading of statutory text,’’’ in a misguided and error-inducing search for a statute’s purposes.133
Without having obstacle preemption as a residual
form of preemption able to sweep in state laws that conflict with congressional purposes, Justice Thomas
needed, it appears, a form of impossibility preemption
that would be sufficiently broad, in his words, to avoid
‘‘render[ing] conflict preemption largely meaningless
. . . [and] most conflicts between state and federal law
illusory.’’134 Whether Justice Thomas’s overarching
theory of preemption — which broadens impossibility
preemption while eliminating obstacle preemption —
will someday capture a Court majority is beyond the
scope of this article. As we now explain, however, his
views do appear to be at odds with the Court’s existing
precedents.
First, as noted above, the obstacle preemption doctrine is routinely employed by every member of the
Court except Justice Thomas. Second, even though Justice Thomas garnered five votes in PLIVA for his impossibility preemption ruling, it is difficult to square that
ruling with Wyeth. The contingencies that Justice Thomas found insufficient to overcome a preemption finding in PLIVA — that the FDA had not been asked to review and therefore did not reject an allegedly safetyenhancing label change — are exactly the
contingencies that led the Court in Wyeth to reject impossibility preemption. To be sure, in Wyeth, the Court
said that it was not impossible to comply with both state
and federal law because Wyeth, a brand-name manufacturer, was authorized by the CBE regulation unilaterally to amend its label.
But the Court rejected preemption by impossibility
for what it termed a ‘‘more fundamental’’ reason:135
that Wyeth could have asked the FDA to amend the label, and ‘‘absent clear evidence that the FDA would not
have approved a change to [the drug’s] label,’’ it was
not ‘‘impossible for Wyeth to comply with both federal
and state requirements.’’136 Noting that ‘‘[i]mpossibility
pre-emption is a demanding defense,’’137 the Court reviewed the record, found no evidence that the FDA
would have rejected a label change, and concluded that
‘‘Wyeth has failed to demonstrate that it was impossible
for it to comply with both federal and state requirements.’’138
132
Id. at 1207 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959
(1983)).
133
Id. at 1207-08, 1212. Justice Thomas’s rejection of any
use of ‘‘obstacle’’ or ‘‘frustration of purposes’’ preemption was
evident this past Term in Williamsonv. Mazda Motor of
America, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011), where he joined in the
Court’s no-preemption result, but not its opinion, and wrote
separately to explain why he rejected the Court’s obstaclepreemption analysis. See id. at 1141-43 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 n.* (2011) (noting Justice Thomas’s
non-joinder in Chief Justice Roberts’s obstacle-preemption
analysis).
134
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2579.
135
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1197.
136
Id. at 1198.
137
Id. at 1199.
138
Id.

9-5-11

The Court seemingly should have come to the same
conclusion in PLIVA: Because the generic manufacturers never asked the FDA for a label change on metoclopramide, let alone obtained a negative answer, the
plaintiffs’ state-law claims should have escaped preemption under Wyeth. Instead, PLIVA came to the opposite conclusion, turning what Wyeth termed a ‘‘demanding defense’’ into no defense at all, and, consistent
with Justice Thomas’s apparent evisceration of the presumption against preemption, effectively equating its
holding that generic manufacturers may not employ the
CBE process with a finding of impossibility preemption.
PLIVA and Wyeth are so difficult to square in this regard that it seems prudent to wait for future regulatory
preemption cases rather than trying to predict whether
Justice Thomas’s new formulation of impossibility preemption will take hold.
One other tension between PLIVA and Wyeth bearing
on impossibility preemption warrants a brief discussion. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent applied Wyeth’s impossibility framework, thus holding that, to obtain preemption, the generic manufacturers had to show that
the FDA would have rejected the change to the metoclopramide label that the plaintiffs claimed would have
prevented their injuries.139 She noted also the Eighth
Circuit’s suggestion that the generic manufacturer
‘‘could not show impossibility because federal law
merely permitted them to sell generic drugs; it did not
require them to do so.’’140 Justice Sotomayor did not
reach that argument because the plaintiffs had not advanced it.141 In Wyeth, however, Justice Thomas himself appears to have endorsed a close variant of that argument. After agreeing with the majority that Wyeth’s
right to use the CBE regulation demanded a nopreemption finding, he went on:
In addition, the text of the statutory provisions governing
FDA drug labeling, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, do not give drug manufacturers an unconditional
right to market their federally approved drug at all times
with the precise label initially approved by the FDA. Thus,
there is no ‘‘direct conflict’’ between the federal labeling
law and the state-court judgment. The statute prohibits the
interstate marketing of any drug, except for those that are
federally approved. . . . To say, as the statute does, that
Wyeth may not market a drug without federal approval
(i.e., without an FDA-approved label) is not to say that federal approval gives Wyeth the unfettered right, for all time,
to market its drug with the specific label that was federally
approved. Initial approval of a label amounts to a finding by
the FDA that the label is safe for purposes of gaining federal approval to market the drug. It does not represent a
finding that the drug, as labeled, can never be deemed unsafe by later federal action, or as in this case, the application of state law.142

Justice Thomas appears to be saying that because
there is no ‘‘unconditional [federal] right to market’’
drugs, there can be no conflict between federal law and
a state-law duty that would impose marketing conditions on those drugs, including conditions on the label
with which those drugs are marketed. Justice Thomas’s
PLIVA opinion does not mention, let alone confront,
this part of his Wyeth concurrence, even though, if ap139

PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2588 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2587 n.8 (citing Mensing, 588 F.3d at 611).
See id.
142
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1210 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
140
141
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plied, it would have seemingly required a different result. After all, generic manufacturers, like their brandname counterparts, have no ‘‘unconditional [federal]
right’’ to market their products, and, thus, it cannot be
said that a state-law marketing restriction, such as a labeling requirement, conflicts with federal law. We do
not know whether Justice Thomas has now rejected this
line of argument espoused in his Wyeth concurrence or,
like Justice Sotomayor, did not confront it in PLIVA because it was not raised there.

3. Deference to Agency Views on Preemption. As explained above in Part II.A.2, the Supreme Court deferred to the FDA’s interpretations of its CBE and
DHCP regulations in a routine application of administrative deference doctrine. The Court then stated, without further explanation: ‘‘Although we defer to the
agency’s interpretation of its regulations, we do not defer to an agency’s ultimate conclusion about whether
state law should be pre-empted.’’143 As noted earlier,
this footnoted holding was arguably important to the result because it freed the majority to render its preemption ruling without giving any weight to the FDA’s nopreemption views.
Though the Court expressed this view as if it flowed
from settled law, it did not. The notion that no deference is ever afforded an agency’s views on preemption
cannot be reconciled with the Court’s recent precedents. The Supreme Court has said that an agency’s
view on whether its regulations preempt state tort law
is entitled to ‘‘some weight.’’144 The Court has explained that, especially when dealing with ‘‘technical’’
and ‘‘complex and extensive’’ subject matter or statutory schemes, ‘‘[t]he agency is likely to have a thorough
understanding of its own regulation and its objectives
and is ‘uniquely qualified’ to comprehend the likely impact of state requirements.’’145
Indeed, just four months before the decision in
PLIVA, in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America,
Inc.,146 a case involving whether a federal motor vehicle
safety standard preempted a state-law damages action,
the Court gave considerable weight to the preemption
views of the Department of Transportation: ‘‘The Solicitor General tells us that DOT’s regulation does not preempt this tort suit. As in Geier, ‘the agency’s own views
should make a difference.’ ’’147 The Court explained
that it was dealing with complex regulatory matters and
again noted that the agency was likely to understand its
own regulatory structure and mission, and thus was
‘‘ ‘uniquely qualified’ to comprehend the likely impact
of state requirements.’’148
In PLIVA, Justice Thomas cited Wyeth as support for
the proposition that the Court ‘‘do[es] not defer’’ to an
agency’s conclusions on preemption. That only tells
part of the story. To be sure, Wyeth said that the Court
has ‘‘not deferred to an agency’s conclusion that state
law is pre-empted,’’149 but it also confirmed that courts
may give weight to an agency’s views on preemption
143

PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575 n.3.
See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861, 883 (2000).
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Id. (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 496 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
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131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011).
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131 S. Ct. at 1139 (quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 883).
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Wyeth, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (emphasis in
original).
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because agencies ‘‘do have a unique understanding of
the statutes they administer and an attendant ability to
make informed determinations about how state requirements may pose an ‘obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’ ’’150 Wyeth went on to reject deference to
the particular agency’s views on preemption expressed
in that case, not because the agency rendered a conclusion as to whether preemption was appropriate, but because the agency’s views had not been expressed with
the ‘‘thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness’’
that the Court looks for when it assesses whether, and
to what degree, to accord administrative deference.151
Moreover, the distinction between deferring to an
agency’s conclusion about preemption and an agency’s
views about whether state requirements conflict with
federal law, by posing an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal objectives, is illusory. A court finds preemption when state law conflicts with federal law, and
deferring to the federal government’s view that such a
conflict does (or does not) exist is tantamount to deferring to its views on the preemption ‘‘conclusion’’ itself.
In fact, in cases where the Court has deferred to the
agency’s views on preemption, such as Geier and Williamson, the Court gave weight to the agency’s view
that federal law should or should not preempt state law
because it believed that the agency was well positioned
to evaluate whether state law conflicted with, or advanced, the objectives of federal law and that the agency’s evaluation had been thorough, persuasive, and not
inconsistent with the agency’s other pronouncements
on the topic.152
A federal agency is not likely to come into court and
ask the court to rubberstamp a legal conclusion about
preemption. Rather, an agency will explain why its
‘‘unique
understanding
of
the
statutes
[it]
administer[s]’’ enables it to ‘‘make informed determinations about how state requirements’’ would advance or
undermine its ability to carry out federal law.153 PLIVA
was no exception. There, the Solicitor General’s amicus
brief did not simply cite the Court’s preemption jurisprudence, state its no-preemption ‘‘conclusion,’’ and
ask for deference. Rather, it explained at length why,
based on the agency’s experience and interpretations of
its own regulations and policies, state-law failure-towarn claims were consistent with the federal obligations of generic drug manufacturers not to misbrand
their products and to bring new safety information to
the agency’s attention.154
The Solicitor General’s brief also urged the Court to
reject the generic manufacturers’ claims that state-law
suits would undermine the FDA’s ability to carry out its
mission — for instance, by encouraging manufacturers
to inundate the agency with insubstantial requests for
labeling changes — as inconsistent with the agency’s
on-the-ground experience.155
150
Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).
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Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
234-35 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)).
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For these reasons, it is difficult to harmonize the
Court’s back-of-the-hand rejection of deference to the
FDA’s preemption views in PLIVA with the Court’s
more serious considerations of agencies’ preemption
views in cases like Geier, Williamson, and Wyeth. The
Court has had a steady diet of regulatory preemption
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cases in recent years, and agencies are eager to express
their views on preemption in those cases. We are therefore likely to get more input from the Court soon on
whether and to what degree agencies’ views on preemption should be accorded weight.
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